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ABSTRACT 
 
This study embeds paid and unpaid care work in a structuralist macroeconomic model. 
Care work is formally modeled as a gendered input into the market production process 
via its impact on the current and future labor force, with altruistic motivations 
determining both how much support people give one another and the economic 
effectiveness of that support. This study uses the model to distinguish between two types 
of economies – a “selfish” versus an “altruistic” economy – and seeks to understand how 
different macroeconomic conditions and events play out in the two cases. Whether and 
how women and men share the financial and time costs of care condition the results of 
the comparison, with more equal sharing of care responsibilities making the “altruistic” 
case more likely.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the 1990s, unpaid work and care have garnered increasing academic attention, 
creating the emerging fields of the economics of unpaid work and the study of “the care 
economy.”1 Most of this work is oriented toward microeconomics, focusing on issues 
such as the household division of labor, subsistence production in developing countries, 
the substitution between nonmarket and market goods and services in households, and the 
role of caring motivations in sectors of the labor market in developed and developing 
countries. Empirical work parallels these theoretical efforts. Examples include measuring 
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unpaid work via time-use surveys across the world, estimating the monetary value or 
opportunity cost of unpaid work, and linking care with the gender–wage gap and 
gendered job segregation.  
Both strands of research on unpaid work and care – theoretical and empirical –
provide invaluable insights into the economic and highly gendered dimensions of these 
issues, but this work also reveals an analytical gap in the literature (Irene van Staveren 
2006). There is not much connection between the theoretical and empirical research on 
care, with the one developing from feminist philosophy and economic methodology and 
the other emerging from statistics, case studies, and game theoretic experiments. This 
distance reflects both the unique role of modeling in economic methodology and the 
dearth of feminist modeling techniques, particularly at the macroeconomic level. Models 
serve as bridges between theory and empirics, helping us specify empirical questions and 
make sense of the results by formally structuring conceptual frameworks developed in 
theoretical analyses. Perhaps because gender is more immediately apparent in the 
microeconomic realm (the sexual division of labor is one of the most salient features of 
households and labor markets), and budding economists are quickly conditioned to see 
macroeconomic aggregates as somehow above the earthy complications of social 
relations, the feminist macro model is rare, with a handful of notable exceptions that tend 
to focus on questions of gender and economic development ( Korkut Ertürk and Nilüfer 
Çağatay 1995; Elissa Braunstein 2000; Marzia Fontana [2002] [This is the year in the 
reference list. If you change the citation in the reference list, please make sure it 
matches the inline citation. Or, if you wish to cite a different source than appears in 
the reference list, please add the new source there.]; Robert Blecker and Stephanie 
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Seguino 2002; Stephanie Seguino 2010 [Seguino’s working paper has been published. 
We have cited the publication.]; A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Lucia C. Hanmer 2008). 
The field is even sparser when the issues of care and unpaid work are introduced, which 
only Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer (2008) and Fontana (2002) include.
2
[We have moved 
this sentence to endnote 2.]  
We contribute to this literature by embedding unpaid work and care in a 
structuralist macro model, as models of this type illustrate how the social structures of 
production matter for economic outcomes, a natural fit for the proposed task. Unpaid 
work and care are formally modeled as a gendered input into the market production 
process via their impact on people as paid workers – the process of reproduction. 
Motivations for care determine both how much support people give one another, and the 
effectiveness of that support in economic terms. We ultimately use the model to 
distinguish between two types of economies – a “selfish” versus an “altruistic” economy, 
both with stereotypical gender norms about the division of labor – and seek to understand 
how different macroeconomic conditions and events play out in the two cases. How 
women and men share the financial and time costs of care condition these results, with 
more equal sharing of reproductive responsibilities making the “altruistic” case more 
likely. While much of our discussion refers to the case of a modern industrial economy, 
the only economic feature required by the structure of the model is a large human 
services sector that primarily employs women, a feature shared by many countries with 
varying levels of industrial development. Before turning to the formal derivation of the 
model, we address some conceptual issues that will ground the discussion that follows.  
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SOME CONCEPTUAL NOTES ON CARE 
 
We define care in both labor process and output terms. In terms of labor process, care is a 
work activity that involves close personal or emotional interaction with those being cared 
for (Nancy Folbre 2006). In terms of output, care refers to services that are inputs into the 
production and maintenance of the labor force. Some forms of care are more direct than 
others, such as bathing a patient versus cleaning a bathroom. To some extent, all work 
could be categorized as indirect care in that its ultimate purpose is to enhance or support 
human life (Folbre 2006). For the purposes of the model, however, care refers to either 
direct care services or indirect services that support care. (In the model, the contrasting 
type of work is the production of durable goods that are used for investment or as capital 
inputs into the care process.) This conceptualization of care is similar to the notion of 
reproduction used by Marxist feminists, where the labor force is reproduced, both in the 
long run in terms of preparing the next generation to enter the labor force, as well as in 
the short run as the daily care given to paid workers to enable them to resume their paid 
work (Nancy Folbre 1994). 
There is an explicit difference between our definition of care as an activity and the 
feelings and intentions that motivate caring activities. In the model below, we refer to 
three different types of motivation for care: self-interest, altruism, and the desire or 
compulsion to fulfill social norms. Self-interest is the standard behavioral rationality 
assumed in economics. By contrast, altruism is a motivation that is other-directed and 
relational, requiring a positively valued, or even affective, personal relationship between 
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two or more agents. The third motivation, social norms, refers to socially sanctioned, 
informal rules that guide individual behavior. These rules, many of which are gender 
specific (including the likelihood that individuals are caregivers), prevail at the individual 
level for a variety of reasons, including fear of sanctions or the psychological 
internalization of norms. Thus behavioral norms may be followed in a calculated way, 
grudgingly, unconsciously, out of habit, or because of a feeling of righteousness or duty. 
There is no automatic correspondence between the motivation for care, and 
whether care work is paid or unpaid, though some (wrongly) presume that unpaid care 
work is somehow more inherently altruistic than paid care work (Nancy Folbre and Julie 
A. Nelson 2000). One proposition we do make, however, is that altruistic care workers 
are more effective at delivering care than those who are otherwise motivated, ceteris 
paribus (Nancy Folbre and Thomas E. Weisskopf 1998). This is simply saying that 
altruistic nurses with the same skills, work loads, income, and bosses will be more 
dedicated care workers than selfish nurses, or those that got into nursing because it 
seemed to be an acceptable female profession. The same goes for unpaid care. Caring for 
an ailing friend out of love seems like it would result in better care, ceteris paribus, than 
caring for a distant relative out of social obligation. We rely here on the notion of 
intrinsic motivation, which is key to an activity such as care, and which has been shown 
in various studies to result in higher labor productivity and lower turnover rates, 
contributing to more efficiency (Bruno S. Frey 1997). Whether one accepts this argument 
is not essential for the dynamics of the model, however. The key point is to differentiate 
between societies that care more and/or better than societies that care less. The reason 
could be social norms around intergenerational obligation that induce altruistic 
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preferences; strong social welfare sectors that create highly skilled and well paid jobs in 
the care sector; or, more likely, gendered ideals that encourage women to provide high 
quality care for little or no pay. 
Gender norms around care constitute our last conceptual point. Unpaid work and 
care have been understood by feminist economists as highly gendered activities with 
gendered meanings, asymmetrically distributed between men and women in both the paid 
and unpaid sectors (M.V. Lee Badgett and Nancy Folbre 1999; Julie A. Nelson and Paula 
England 2002). Thus, economic analyses of unpaid work and care must be gender aware, 
as these activities impact the economic lives of women and men differently. For instance, 
women’s disproportionate share of unpaid work relative to men constitutes a stronger 
constraint on their participation in and gains from the market and the state. Women’s 
lower incomes and relative lack of power over public finance decisions contribute to this 
inequality. At the same time, the gendered care components of paid work help to explain 
differences in male and female employment and wages, as described so well by Richard 
Anker (1998). We capture these divisions in the model by positing gender segregated 
labor markets and women’s association with paid care work. Both women and men 
contribute to the financial and time costs of providing care in the household, however, 
just to varying degrees. 
 
 
A MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH CARE 
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We construct a simple structuralist model of the macroeconomy, drawing on a long list of 
similar models in the structuralist literature (Robert Blecker 1989; Stephen A. Marglin 
and Amit Bhaduri 1990; Blecker and Seguino 2002; Lance Taylor 2004). In these 
models, which develop both classical-Marxian [OK?] and Keynesian insights in order to 
construct a framework alternative to the textbook aggregate demand–aggregate supply 
model, the distribution of income plays a central role in consumption, investment, and the 
level of output. As in classical-Marxian [OK?] frameworks, production is not viewed as 
constrained by the availability of labor. At the same time, as in the Keynesian tradition, it 
is the level of output that adjusts (at least in the short run) in order to equalize decisions 
by firms and households about planned investment and savings respectively. Firms 
operate with excess capacity, and changes in the short-run level of output change the 
degree of capacity utilization of the economy. This is to say that the existing capital stock 
does not constrain the level of output. It follows that economies are demand-constrained, 
and there can be involuntary unemployment. Wages are set not by the marginal product 
of labor, as in neoclassical models, but rather via a social bargaining process between 
capitalists and paid workers. Also, it does not really matter whether or not wages are 
sticky in the short run;
3
 what matters is labor’s ability to negotiate higher wages when the 
economy is expanding. The equilibrium in structuralist models determines 
simultaneously a rate of capacity utilization and one distributive variable, such as the 
profit share. Although comparable to a standard aggregate demand–aggregate supply 
model, a structuralist framework emphasizes the interplay between output adjustments 
and income distribution, rather than the role of price adjustments in restoring a 
macroeconomic equilibrium after demand or supply shocks.  
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Only a handful of structuralist models explicitly incorporate gender, and among 
those that do, the focus is most often on the macroeconomic dynamics of gender-based 
wage inequality and women’s labor force participation in a development context (Ertürk 
and Çağatay 1995; Braunstein 2000; Blecker and Seguino 2002; Seguino 2010). By 
contrast, we incorporate unpaid work and care, and the implications of its gendered 
distribution, into a model that can accommodate a variety of economic structures. There 
is only one other similar effort that we know of where the authors add a household sector 
to standard commodity production in what is described as a post-Keynesian modeling 
framework (Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer 2008). We hope to add to their efforts by focusing 
on the issues of income distribution and the level of output, adding more methodological 
detail, and explicitly incorporating gendered bargaining around the time and financial 
costs of care. 
Before getting into the standard sequencing for presenting macroeconomic models 
such as this one, we introduce how we portray the economic dimensions of unpaid work 
and care, building on the points developed previously . At its core, the model is about 
treating labor as a produced means of production. This production process is primarily 
carried out by women (but also by men) doing both paid and unpaid work and 
alternatively motivated by altruism, self-interest, and the structure of social norms.   
In the short term, we model two kinds of labor inputs into the paid economy: 
“human capacities,” which are produced in the household sector using women’s and 
men’s unpaid labor time and the commodities that the household purchases [OK?]. We 
draw capacities in the widest sense of the term and include a broad array of features that 
make human beings more economically effective (such as emotional maturity, patience, 
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self-confidence, and the ability to work well with others, as well as standard human 
capital measures such as skills and education). Because of this definition, we feel it 
makes more sense to model inputs of short-term capacities into the market production 
process in terms of labor productivity rather than labor hours. Since this is the short term, 
and the model is drawn in a context of deficient aggregate demand, an individual’s paid 
work time should depend on the extent of market demand for labor – either one can find a 
job or not. Productivity once at work, however, depends on the extent to which one is 
being supported and replenished at home, the day-to-day aspects of reproduction. 
In the long term, conversely, spending time or money on the production of human 
capacities is treated as an investment rather than daily maintenance. Investments in 
human capacities (such as sending a child to school, seeing a professional therapist, or 
volunteering at a community center in ways that enhance social capital) raise future 
productive capacity in ways similar to building more plants and equipment, though 
investing in future labor capacities is almost never treated as investment in standard 
macroeconomic models. As with conventional treatments of investment, investment in 
human capacities generates current demand for output as well as contributes to long-term 
economic prospects, though this version of the model focuses on the former short-term 
impacts. 
The close reader will note that we have not yet specified how care, the paid and 
unpaid work that goes into the production, maintenance, and renewal of human beings, 
works into these dynamics. In terms of investment, motivations for care condition the 
choice to invest, a decision that may otherwise be based exclusively on expectations 
about future market opportunities. In the short term, motivations for care condition the 
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shift from nonmarket to market work that typically accompanies increases in wages, as 
well as specify the efficiency of market substitutes for unpaid care work. 
[We have added the following two sentences to this paragraph.] This description is 
intentionally sketched rather than highly detailed and precisely defined. For that we must 
develop the formal model, a task to which we now turn.  
 
 
The demand side 
 
The structure of the model follows that of Braunstein (2000), which in turn is based on 
Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), with the exception that we model a closed economy, leaving 
the dynamics of globalization to future studies. National income Y  is split between 
capitalists who receive profits   and workers who receive wages W ; we make an 
additional differentiation between total male wage income Wm  and total female wage 
income W f . The distribution of national income is represented by shares, where dividing 
equation (1) by Y  gives equation (2); profit’s share of income is represented by  , with 
male and female labor’s share represented by wm  and w f  respectively. 
Y  R Wm W f    (1) 
1  wm w f   (2) 
The capitalist’s profit rate r , defined as total profits divided by the physical capital stock 
K , can be related to the profit share via some simple accounting as illustrated in equation 
(3). By introducing the notion of full capacity national income Y , we express the profit 
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rate as the multiplicative product of the profit share  , capacity utilization Y Y  z , 
and full capacity output divided by the capital stock Y K . Now we have defined the 
two state variables (the variables that we use to characterize the dynamics of the 
macroeconomic system): profit share   and capacity utilization z . Choosing these state 
variables reflects the importance of income distribution and aggregate demand in the 
structuralist approach.  
r  R K  R Y  Y Y Y K  zy  (3) 
Equation (4) defines investment demand i  as depending on physical investment i  
and investment in human capacities, ia . Physical investment is undertaken by capitalists 
and depends on their expectations about future profit rates, r e . Using capitalist 
expectations about future profit rates reflects the Keynesian notion of fundamental 
uncertainty, which suggests that the future is inherently unknowable. However, capitalist 
expectations about future profit rates get more optimistic when current profit shares are 
high (assuming output can be sold), so r
e  0  (note that throughout this study, partial 
derivatives are indicated by subscripts). Similarly, when capacity utilization is high, 
capitalists suspect that expansion is justified by current demand conditions, so rz
e  0 . 
The relationship between expected profit rates and physical investment demand i
re
K
 
is 
based on what Keynes termed “animal spirits,” a sort of “spontaneous urge to action” that 
is built on widely acknowledged but poorly understood waves of market confidence and 
panic.
4
  
i  iK re(,z)  ia oe(,z)     (4) 
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r
e  0; rz
e  0; i
re
K  0
o
e  0; oz
e  0; i
oe
a  0
    
Investment in human capacities follows a parallel path. Rather than basing their 
decisions on expected profit rates, individuals invest in themselves and others based on 
expected opportunities oe . These expectations are dampened by the profit share, 
assuming one can get a job (given z ), a higher profit share means lower wages, so 
o
e  0 . And by the same token, higher capacity utilization means that more investment is 
justified by current employment conditions (given a particular split between profits and 
wages), and oz
e  0 . It is important to note that investments in human capacities can take 
the form of commodities or time; equation (4) details the demand for investment, not how 
it is financed.
5
 The pathway from expectations about future opportunities to actual 
investments in human capacities i
oe
a
 is governed by what we term “caring spirits”: the 
tendency, whether determined by social norms or individual motivation, to provide care 
for one’s self and others in ways that add to current aggregate demand and future 
economic productivity. Studies of the link between what we would consider care and 
productivity are extensive, ranging from the economics literature on the linkages between 
human and social capital and economic growth (James S. Coleman 1988; Stephen Knack 
and Philip Keefer 1997), to the public health literature on the labor costs of poor physical 
and mental health (Wayne N. Burton, Daniel J. Conti, Chin-Yu Chen, Alyssa B. Schultz, 
and Dee W. Edington 1999; Walter F. Stewart, Judith A. Ricci, Elsbeth Chee, Steven R. 
Hahn, and David Morganstein 2003), to the business literature on how support for care, 
by employers and in the home, enhances labor productivity (William Van Lear and 
Lynette Fowler 1997; Fran Durekas 2009 [Durekas is not included in References. 
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Please complete the entry we have begun.]). Keep in mind, however, that ours is a 
short-run model, and so we only capture the effect of these types of investments on 
current output (for example, the construction of a community center or an employer 
opening an on-site childcare center ). 
Let us pause for a moment over the proposition that caring spirits govern 
investment in human capacities. After spending so much time clarifying that we use the 
term “care” to refer to an activity as opposed to a feeling, how can we then use it to 
characterize “spirits”? The reason is we use caring spirits, which are analogous to 
Keynes’s animal spirits [We have deleted this because you have already defined this. 
If you would like to remind the reader of this definition, please briefly restate it in 
parentheses rather than referring to a previous endnote.], to describe the exogenous 
effect of whether care is enthusiastically provided, for whatever reason. Modeling caring 
spirits in terms that evoke animal spirits in the investment function underscores the 
importance of care in a society’s macroeconomic fortunes. But this parallel should not be 
taken to mean that it works in precisely the same way as physical investment decisions. 
Animal spirits refer to the essentially irrational, often herd-like sentiments that tend to 
characterize financial markets. Caring spirits are long-term, institutional features of 
society.  
To understand how caring spirits shape human capacities investment demand, 
consider the following expression, dia  i
oe
a o
e d  oz
e dz , with the letter d referring to a 
change. It shows that the change in human capacities investment demand, dia , equals the 
responsiveness of that demand to changes in expected opportunities, i
oe
a
, multiplied by 
the change in expected opportunities due to changes in the wage share, o
ed , plus the 
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change in expected opportunities due to changes in output, oz
edz . We differentiate 
between two types of regimes for caring spirits. We argue that, all else being equal, 
changes in expected opportunities will have a bigger impact on investment in human 
capacities in altruistic societies than in selfish ones (that is, i
oe
a
 will be higher). The 
reason is that, all else equal, altruistic societies (relative to selfish ones) tend to spend 
more of their care finances and time in ways that enhance the ability of household or 
community members to take advantage of future economic opportunities through, for 
instance, programs such as education or job training for the disabled. (Note that the 
model captures the impact of these investment decisions on current output via its impact 
on aggregate demand.) When wages or output decline and expected opportunities worsen, 
these sorts of investments decline as well, especially in altruistic societies where care 
resources get reallocated to countering the short-term effects of economic decline and 
wage squeeze, such as attending to the emotional stress of unemployment or 
compensating for declines in public expenditures on healthcare and other public goods. 
This sort of dis-investment in human capital and the consequent pressure on the unpaid 
care sector has been a frequent criticism of structural adjustment programs (Diane Elson 
1995 [please see our note in the reference list.]). The net result is that the elasticity of 
investment in human capacities with respect to changes in expected opportunities is 
higher in altruistic societies than selfish ones.
6
 Just how much higher is a question we 
return to after working through the rest of the demand side. 
Savings is separate from investment in the sense that savers do not save in order 
to invest. Instead, savings depend on the marginal propensities to spend by capital and 
labor. A key assumption is that the marginal propensity to consume out of wages is 
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greater than the marginal propensity to consume out of profits (capital saves more than 
paid workers). Equation (5) puts savings, s , in terms of the profit share and capacity 
utilization of the model’s state variables. An increase in the profit share raises savings 
because capitalists save more than paid workers (s  0) , and an increase in capacity 
utilization increases savings via increases in the profit rate (sz  0) .  
s(,z) s  0; sz  0  (5) 
On the demand side, macroeconomic equilibrium means that the investment that 
investors desire equals that supplied by savers, and the result is termed the IS schedule to 
denote investment–savings equilibrium, as indicated by equation (6). Some authors in the 
structuralist tradition, such as Taylor (2004), refer to what we term the IS curve as the 
demand regime of an economy, so we use these labels interchangeably. The slope of the 
IS schedule in z,  space is given in equation (7). The signs of partial derivatives are 
noted above the relevant variables for ease of reference. 
IS schedule: iK re(,z)  ia oe(,z)    s ,z  (6) 
IS slope: 
d
dz

s

z (iz
K

 iz
a

)
i
K

 i
a

 s

 (7) 
A key issue on the demand side is whether the IS curve is upward or downward sloping – 
whether declines in profit share are associated with declines or increases in output. The 
sign of equation (7) determines these relationships. Beginning with the numerator, it is 
standard to assume that savings are more responsive to changes in output than investment 
to ensure the system’s stability. Otherwise, any disturbance to equilibrium will cause 
investment demand to outpace savings until the economy ends up at either zero output or 
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full capacity utilization; this assumption is often referred to as “Keynesian stability” to 
reflect its origins in elementary Keynesian theory (Marglin and Bhaduri 1990: 164). Our 
specification is a bit different in that the numerator also contains the positive effect of 
capacity utilization on human capacities investment demand, and these investments (the 
financial aspects of them, at least) are only partly financed out of what we typically 
consider to be savings (for example, borrowing money from a bank to pay for college). 
Current earnings finance some of these investments in the same way as consumption, like 
spending on healthcare or after-school programs, though borrowing also finances some. 
Including these types of investments means that our notion of savings should be 
supplemented to include some aspects of current spending, though saving and investment 
can still be treated as (at least partly) disconnected.
7
 Even when we add these components 
to savings and investment, we are still constrained by the Keynesian stability condition 
that savings must be more responsive to changes in capacity utilization than demand for 
investment in capital and human capacities. 
Turning to the denominator, if s  i
K  i
a
, then the IS curve is downward sloping 
as indicated in Figure 1, and there is a negative association between profit share and 
capacity utilization in the goods market. A case in which aggregate demand equilibrium 
implies that the profit share declines with capacity utilization is traditionally referred to in 
the structuralist literature as a wage-led demand regime. Conversely, if s  i
K  i
a
, then 
the IS curve will slope upwards, and higher profit shares are associated with increases in 
output, leading to a profit-led demand regime. The negative impact of profit share on 
investments in human capacities, i
a
, acts by pushing the slope of the IS curve downward, 
so that an increase in wages is associated with more economic activity. In other words, 
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the negative slope means that the increase in consumer demand and investment in human 
capacities, brought about by an increase in the wage share, outweighs the decline in 
physical investment demand induced by the decline in profit share. In fact, the more 
pronounced an economy’s caring spirits (that is, the greater the elasticity of ia  with 
respect to o
e ), the more likely it is that higher wages will lead to higher output. We use 
the nature of caring spirits as a way to differentiate between the two IS regimes, with ISA  
referring to the altruistic case and ISS  referring to the selfish case. The pathway indicated 
by the arrow in Figure 1 shows that as caring spirits decline, the ISA  curve steepens, 
requiring ever larger wage increases to yield the same positive outcome in terms of 
capacity utilization. When caring spirits are low enough, the slope of the IS curve 
becomes positive, and the economy shifts to the ISS regime where higher profit shares are 
associated with more output. In terms of the magnitude of the slope, the more altruistic 
the caring spirits, the flatter the (downward sloping) ISA  schedule, while more 
pronounced selfishness is associated with flatter upward sloping ISS  schedules.  
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The supply side 
 
The supply side of the economy, which structures what is referred to as the “producer’s 
equilibrium” or the PE curve, is constituted by interaction among three different spheres: 
the labor market, the product market, and the production of human capacities in the 
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household sector. The novelty in our approach lies in introducing human capacities as a 
determinant of the producer’s equilibrium.  
In the gender-segregated labor market we posit [OK?], women and men work in 
two different industries. Women work in the service or nondurable goods industry; this 
industry produces market substitutes for the unpaid care that women and men contribute 
to reproduction. Men work in the durable goods industry producing physical investment 
goods as well as goods that complement care work, both in the market and at home. 
When we refer to the “female sector” and the “male sector,” we refer to these industries 
respectively.
8
 Durable goods are normal goods, so as income increases so does demand 
for them, with the result that when workers shift from market to nonmarket production, 
there is a concomitant decline in the demand for durable goods even though these goods 
complement both paid and unpaid care work. Think of washing machines, a durable 
good, as an example. Both commercial laundries and households use washing machines 
to maintain human beings, but households are less likely to buy their own or replace an 
old machine if there is less household income. 
Equilibrium wages result from an underlying process of bargaining that occurs 
between paid workers and capitalists, a process that results in labor’s bargaining power 
(and wages) rising along with capacity utilization.
9
 The basic textbook idea is that as 
capacity utilization increases and unemployment declines, labor gains bargaining power 
relative to capital. Since labor markets are segmented by gender, the economy-wide 
measure of capacity utilization z  is actually a weighted average of capacity utilization in 
the male and female sectors. Because male durable goods are normal goods, capacity 
utilization in the two sectors move together (though not in fixed proportions as workers 
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move in and out of the unpaid sector), and we use the economy-wide measure of capacity 
utilization in the determination of both women’s and men’s wages.  
Equations (8) and (9) represent these relationships for female and male labor 
markets respectively, with f  referring to the female hourly wage and m  referring to the 
male hourly wage. The elasticity of wages with respect to capacity utilization is positive, 
though the magnitude of this elasticity depends on the ability of paid workers to 
successfully translate tighter labor markets into higher wages. Because women’s 
collective bargaining power vis-à-vis capitalists tends to be lower than men’s (partly 
because of the availability of nonmarket substitutes for female market production), we 
assume mz  fz . 
f  f (z) fz  0   (8) 
m  m(z) mz  0   (9) 
When nominal wages change, capitalist behavior in product markets determines 
the extent to which these wage changes are passed on in the form of higher (or lower) 
prices. Equations (10) and (11) represent these behavioral dynamics, with capitalists 
choosing prices (Pm  for the male sector good and Pf  for the female sector good) by 
marking up over the unit costs of production. For the male durable goods sector in 
equation (10),   equals one plus the capitalist’s markup over unit cost, with unit cost 
equal to the male hourly wage m  times the labor coefficient a . The labor coefficient 
equals the number of hours it takes a paid worker to produce one unit of a good 
(equivalent to the reciprocal of labor productivity). Note that the lower the labor 
coefficient, the more productive the paid worker. Therefore, equation (10) says that the 
price of a unit of the male good, Pm , is determined by multiplying one plus the markup 
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times the wage costs of producing that one unit ma .10 Equation (11) represents the same 
concepts for the female nondurable goods/services sector, with   equal to one plus the 
markup. For ease of exposition, we further assume that the labor coefficient a  is the 
same for the two sectors. 
Pm  ma  1  (10) 
Pf  fa  1  (11) 
We know that bargaining between capital and labor determines wages in labor 
markets, as described by equations (8) and (9). What about markups? Because we are 
interested in the dynamics of reproduction, we assume a fixed markup in the male sector, 
a common convention in structuralist models (see for instance Marglin and Bhaduri 
[1990]). With a fixed markup and a little algebraic manipulation, we can show that the 
profit share in the male sector m  is constant, as in equation (12).  
m 
( 1)
  (12) 
Conversely, the markup in the female sector is endogenous, and reflects the power of 
female sector capitalists (service sector capitalists), a power that is based on market 
demand conditions and the power of (female) organized labor.
11
 The basic logic is that 
the higher market demand is, or the less power female trade unions have, the more room 
capitalists have to raise the markup. Three factors determine the power of service sector 
capitalists to change the markup: (1) Pm , the price of male goods, which are a 
complement for women’s market production, thus Pm  0  ; (2) H , which represents the 
time women and men spend on unpaid care work and is inversely related to the demand 
for female market goods, so H  0 ; and (3) female wages f , which reflect how the 
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bargaining power of women’s labor cuts into the ability of capitalists to impose higher 
markups. Equation (13) captures these relationships, and substitution from equations (8) 
and (10), along with a bit of algebra, results in an expression for the female sector profit 
share in equation (14). 
  Pm;H; f  Pm  0; H  0;  f  0  (13) 
  1
1
 m(z)a;H; f (z) 
  (14) 
As mentioned in the introduction to the model, the economy-wide profit share   equals a 
weighted sum of profit shares in the male and female sectors. Since m  is a constant and 
demand for male and female market goods move together, we use changes in  f  as a 
proxy for changes in  . This is not an oversimplification, because a constant profit share 
in the male sector acts just like a shift variable in the producer’s equilibrium. 
To complete the producer’s equilibrium, we add the daily maintenance of human 
capacities in the household sector. Human capacities are produced by a combination of 
women’s and men’s unpaid work time and the commodities that are purchased as inputs 
into household production. Beginning with nonmarket labor supply, equation (15) relates 
unpaid work time to its opportunity cost, namely the wage that could be earned 
participating in market activities. The function H  can be thought of as a reduced 
formresult of intrahousehold negotiations: partners bargain over the time each will spend 
on reproductive labor by weighing its opportunity costs, namely the wage each could earn 
in market activities. Intrahousehold bargaining is a complex process conditioned by 
social norms and individual motivations. That said, it seems reasonable to assume that 
Hm  H f  because of gender norms regarding the sexual division of labor. That is, all 
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else equal, because of the widespread dominance of social norms that identify unpaid 
care work as “women’s work,” men will be more responsive to the pull of higher wages 
than women.  
Note that the amount of unpaid work time that women and men ultimately 
dedicate to household production depends on the interaction of two effects: the 
responsiveness of female (male) labor supply to wages H f (Hm )  times the ability of 
female (male) paid workers to bargain with capitalists over wages in the labor market 
fz (mz ) . This aspect is important to consider, both in absolute and relative terms. First, if 
H f  is small (perhaps because women are strongly time altruistic or because social 
norms discourage women’s market work), and fz  is large (because of strong collective 
bargaining institutions), the result of a change in capacity utilization may look the same 
as a society characterized by the opposite – social norms that support women’s market 
work combined with weak labor unions. Second, since men’s bargaining power is 
(assumed to be) higher than women’s in the workplace (mz  fz ) , it is also the case that 
Hmmz  H f fz . So as capacity utilization increases, men lower their unpaid work time 
more than women do. 
H  H f (z);m(z)  H f  0; Hm  0  (15) 
Going back to household production, equation (16) puts human capacity 
production in terms of the labor coefficient a , introduced in equations (10) and (11), and 
the idea that market labor productivity depends on the reproduction of labor power the 
household sector provides. Recall that the labor coefficient is the reciprocal of labor 
productivity, so anything that contributes to reproduction actually lowers . If women 
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and men spend less time at home, capacities may suffer, lowering market labor 
productivity and raising the labor coefficient, so aH  0 . The magnitude of aH , the 
extent to which human capacities change pursuant to a change in nonmarket labor time, 
depends on the productivity of that labor time. This can be specified in a number of ways, 
and certainly involves factors like skill, motivation, the availability of care related capital 
goods, and of course the state of one’s own human capacities (tired caregivers are usually 
less effective ones).  
The terms a f  and am  capture both the gendered nature of financing the monetary 
costs of reproduction and how effective commodities are in contributing to reproduction. 
To the extent that commodities contribute to capacities (more on this in a moment), 
a f  0  
and am  0 , with f (z)  and m(z) , reflecting how wages are determined in labor 
markets. There are two processes at work here. First there is the question of the 
proportion of higher wages that are devoted to reproduction, and then there is the issue of 
what these financial contributions actually purchase. Like decisions about time, these 
financial decisions are also the result of an intrahousehold bargaining process. So in 
addition to the share of income, a f  and am  also depend on whether commodities provide 
good substitutes or complements for unpaid care (think of altruistic and well paid versus 
selfish and underpaid care sector workers, or purchasing a refrigerator versus a television 
set).  
Now to sum up our points about equation (16), an increase in capacity utilization 
has both a negative (time) effect through the increase in the opportunity cost of unpaid 
work and a positive (income) effect on the production of capacities through consumption 
of market care goods, though the latter effect is conditioned by the gender distribution of 
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the financial costs of reproduction and what care and capital commodities households 
ultimately decide to purchase.  
a  a f (z); m(z); H f (z);m(z)   a f  0; am  0; aH  0  (16)  
We are now able to characterize the producer’s equilibrium. Substituting 
equations (15) and (16) into (14) while recalling that the male sector profit share is a 
constant, equation (17) is the producer’s equilibrium or PE schedule. It is also common  
to refer to a schedule linking distributive shares with capacity utilization via supply-side 
considerations as the distributive curve (Taylor 2004): henceforth, we will use the two 
terms interchangeably. 
 
 
PE schedule or distributive curve  
[We have formatted the above text as a second-level subheading. OK?] 
 
  m   f   
1
  




     
where       2 
1

  (17) 
 
  m(z)a f (z); m(z); H( f (z),m(z)) ; H f (z),m(z) ; f (z) 
                                        
 
 m(z)a f (z);m(z);H f (z);m(z)  ; H f (z);m(z)   
As with the IS curve, to get the slope in z,  space we take the total derivative of 
equation (17) with respect to z  and  . The result is given in equation (18). 
PE slope  [OK?]
 
 
d
dz

  
   
2
 (18) 
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The sign of the slope of the PE curve depends on the sign of the numerator  () . The 
second line of equation (18) organizes  ()  in a way that facilitates discussion. The 
signs of partial derivatives are displayed above the appropriate variable and a summary 
explanation of these signs is reported in Table 1. 
 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE
 
The first bracket in equation (18) is the collective bargaining effect, where 
stronger labor unions (in both the male and female sectors) tend to pull down the profit 
share, and the slope of the distributive curve as capacity utilization increases. The second 
and third brackets together represent what we call the substitutability effect, and capture 
the net effect of using market substitutes for unpaid work time on the services sector. 
Essentially, two dynamics are at work here: (1) whether market goods yield effective 
substitutes for time in the production of human capacities (the second bracket), which we 
refer to for brevity as goods substitutability; and (2) the extent to which men and women 
actually use market goods and services as a way to compensate for decreases (or save 
money in the context of increases) in their unpaid work time (the third bracket). The latter 
we refer to as (pure) time substitutability.  
While time substitutability acts unambiguously pulling the PE curve to slope 
upwards, the effect of goods substitutability is not clear in principle. The reason why is 
that there are two contradictory dynamics at work. First, there is the negative effect of 
declines in unpaid time on the production of human capacities as wages rise (aHH f  
and 
 27 
aHHm ), which in turn lower the space for markups because paid service sector workers 
have become less productive (a ) . Secondly, paid workers can compensate for this 
decline in unpaid care work time by using higher wages to purchase more care services or 
durable goods that make unpaid care time more efficient ( a f  
and am ), which will raise 
human capacities and productivity, enabling capitalists to make more profit on each unit 
sold. Hence we use the term “goods substitutability” to represent how well goods 
substitute for time. (Note that the [pure] time substitutability effect, the third bracket, is 
distinct from the time dynamics of goods substitutability because the former captures 
how the contraction of time increases demand for paid care services – not how increased 
use of these services affect labor productivity.) 
In terms of the net effect of time and goods substitutability on the PE slope, we 
differentiate between two stylized cases: high versus low substitutability. If 
substitutability between market and nonmarket work is low, the entry of greater numbers 
of unpaid caregivers into the paid workforce (via higher rates of capacity utilization) will 
compromise the production of human capacities without much increase in demand for 
female market goods, squeezing the capitalist markup and resulting in a downward 
sloping PE schedule. This case is traditionally referred to as “profit squeeze” in the 
structuralist literature (Taylor 2004). Conversely, if substitutability is high (meaning that 
commodities are effective at counterbalancing the effects of declines in unpaid work time 
on human capacities and households use them as substitutes), then increases in capacity 
utilization will raise human capacities as well as market demand for female goods. This 
would in turn lead to higher markups, profit shares, and an upward sloping PE curve, or 
equivalently a distributive curve displaying so-called “forced saving” [OK?]. The 
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emphasis on class in both classical-Marxian [OK?] and post-Keynesian frameworks is 
usually modeled by portraying capitalists as having a higher propensity to save than paid 
workers (something we also assume). If an increase in economic activity redistributes 
income toward profits, total savings will also increase in the economy, hence the label 
“forced saving” when the PE curve is upward sloping.  
What about the gender distribution of care, how does it affect the PE schedule? 
Because women and men contribute both money and time to reproduction, their decisions 
about supplying and purchasing care affect the macroeconomy in the same way. Less 
time or money being put toward care, regardless of its source, will lower the production 
of human capacities and dampen demand for the female market sector goods, lowering 
markups, profit shares, and the PE slope. We can, however, introduce some stylistic 
differences between men and women in their behavior around care and characterize the 
results. The more men and women share the time and financial costs of care the more 
likely that the PE slope is positive (meaning that increases in capacity utilization will 
increase the production of human capacities by more than it cuts into capitalist power vis-
à-vis labor); we call this the “gender egalitarian” (GE) case. Conversely, in cases where 
men contribute very little to care either in terms of time or financing, it is more likely that 
the PE slope will be negative; we call this the “single mother” (SM) case.12 A third 
possibility is where men contribute a lot to care financially but contribute little in terms 
of time, what we term the “traditional” (TR) case. This last case is actually the strongest 
in terms of contributing to a positive PE slope because higher capacity utilization results 
in a lot more money being contributed to care, with less time sacrifice than the GE case 
(as men’s lower time contributions to care in the traditional case means there is less time 
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to give up in the first place). We can thus think of the PE/TR slope as steeper than the 
PE/GE slope, though both are positive. 
To get the ultimate direction of the PE schedule, we must account for the 
collective bargaining, substitutability, and gender distribution of care effects 
simultaneously. Because we are interested in the gendered dynamics of care, we hold the 
collective bargaining effect constant and focus on substitutability and the gender 
distribution of care. Table 2 presents a taxonomy of potential cases; a plus indicates a 
positive slope, a minus a negative slope, and a question mark that the slope is 
indeterminate. The rows refer to the gender distribution of care, with the TR case getting 
a double plus sign to indicate the larger (positive) effect it has on the PE slope relative to 
the GE case. For the columns, when substitutability between market and nonmarket work 
is high, the PE schedule will tend to slope upwards; when substitutability is low, the PE 
curve will slope downwards. The case of gender egalitarian care relations and high 
substitutability results in a positive slope since both gendered care relations and 
substitutability work in the same direction; the case of traditional care relations and high 
substitutability also results in positive slope, but with a steeper PE curve than the prior 
case. The third clear case is where only women engage in care (the SM case), combined 
with low substitutability between market and nonmarket care, which results in a 
downward sloping PE curve. 
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE. 
To evaluate a stylized case that we can relate to the IS schedules for selfish versus 
altruistic caring spirits, we differentiate between the high and low substitutability cases, 
keeping in mind how the gender relations around care can work against or reinforce this 
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contrast. High substitutability results in a positive association between z  and   – the 
PE/HS case; and low substitutability results in a negative association between z  and   – 
the PE/LS case. Gender egalitarian and traditional societies are more likely to conform to 
the PE/HS case, while societies where women take on the costs of care largely on their 
own are more likely to be a PE/LS case. Figure 2 illustrates the two cases. [Please 
indicate where Figure 2 should appear in the text as you have done for the tables 
and Figure 1] Note that there is the question of magnitude as well as sign. The higher the 
degree of substitutability or the more gender egalitarian, the flatter the (upward sloping) 
PE/HS schedule. As substitutability declines and/or gender relations get more traditional, 
the PE/HS curve steepens, until it bears a negative slope, again flattening (but with a 
negative slope) as substitutability continues to decline and/or men become completely 
uninvolved in the provision of care. The pathway of these dynamics from one regime to 
another is indicated by the direction of the arrow in Figure 2. 
 
 
A MODEL EXERCISE: AN ALTRUISTIC ECONOMY VERSUS A SELFISH 
ECONOMY 
 
Putting the IS and PE schedules together, we maintain that societies with altruistic caring 
spirits are more likely to also have high substitutability between market and nonmarket 
work (PE/HS paired with ISA , which we refer to as an altruistic economy), with the 
opposite being the case as well (PE/LS paired with ISS , which we refer to as a selfish 
economy). The reason is that when men and women do take on market work, they 
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minimize the deleterious effects on human capacities by cutting into leisure time or even 
sleep.  In our model, women in particular bring their caring capacities to their market 
work, making them simultaneously more likely lose sleep and leisure time  and more 
effective paid care workers. [OK?] 
The effect of the gender distribution of care on this system operates via the PE 
slope, as detailed in Table 2. It is difficult to imagine that an economy characterized as 
altruistic would leave the financial and time costs of care exclusively to women (as 
evidenced by the indeterminacy of the slope in the PE/HS/SM case), so we posit that 
selfish economies are also more likely to conform to the single mother case. This is not to 
say that single mothers are selfish, or that traditional and egalitarian societies do not also 
have single mothers. The label is merely meant to indicate a society where mothers are 
left to shoulder the time and financial costs of care alone. For the high substitutability 
case, we contrast two types of gender relations related to care: the PE/HS/TR case, where 
the combination of high substitutability and traditional gender relations result in a steep 
positive slope; and the PE/HS/GE case, where the combination of high substitutability 
and gender egalitarian care relations result in a flat positive slope. Hence, both gender 
egalitarian and traditional relations of care are consistent with an altruistic economy, but 
the gendered relations of care change the magnitude of the PE slope. 
 With these three regimes in mind, we can trace the relative impact of different 
sorts of public policies on profit share and capacity utilization.
13
 Figure 3 illustrates the 
results of policies designed to strengthen the positive correlation between female wages 
and output for the selfish and altruistic cases, with the arrows indicating how the PE 
curves shift after the policy is implemented. [Please indicate where Figure 3 should 
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appear in the text as you have done for the tables and Figure 1] These policies could 
include measures that raise the bargaining power of paid women workers relative to 
capitalists, such as laws that make it easier for unions to organize paid care sector 
workers. Another example would be an increase in the legislated minimum wage, as 
service sector workers are more likely to work for very low wages, and raising the wage 
floor can spill over into higher paid sectors as it lowers competition for higher wage jobs. 
To the extent that women are systematically underpaid because care work is undervalued 
in markets, all else being equal, comparable worth policies would also raise women’s 
wages. 
 In the altruistic economies, both gender egalitarian (PE/HS/GE) and traditional 
(PE/HS/TR), higher female wages shift down the PE schedule, resulting in a lower profit 
share (the shift from    to 1 ) but higher output (the shift from z

 to z1 ). The reason is 
that even though higher wages put a squeeze on the unpaid reproductive sector in terms 
of lowering unpaid work time and making market substitutes for that unpaid work more 
expensive, this loss is compensated by a combination of effective market substitutes for 
which the positive income effect allows substitution, and the ongoing maintenance of 
those aspects of household work for which no market substitutes can be found. In order to 
compare the relative effects of the same change in wages in the traditional and gender 
egalitarian cases, we extend the   intercepts of the PE curves to the axis to illustrate how 
both curves shift out by the same amount. With the same exogenous change in female 
wages, the more gender egalitarian the care relations, the larger the positive effect on 
output, as indicated by z1,GE  z1,TR . Intuitively, this comes from the fact that in 
traditional societies, higher female wages lower nonmarket care time and make market 
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substitutes more expensive, with men doing less than in the gender egalitarian case to 
compensate.  
In addition, the more altruistic the caring spirits captured by the IS schedule, the 
flatter the IS curve, and the greater the positive impact this shift in the PE schedule will 
have on output in both the gender egalitarian and the traditional cases. Movement down 
the IS curve illustrates how the decline in demand for investment in physical capital is 
more than outweighed by increased demand for investment in human capacities that 
accompany a higher wage share. Conversely, the opposite occurs in the selfish economy, 
with higher female wages leading to a decline in economic activity as decreases in unpaid 
care work are not counterbalanced by the positive effects of higher wages on human 
capacity production. Similarly, the weaker the caring spirits of potential investors in 
human capacities are, the flatter the ISS  curve, and the bigger the negative impact of 
higher female wages on market output. 
 The model exercise shows that an increase in female wages contributes to output 
in an altruistic economy and not in a selfish economy. This seems to suggest that in an 
altruistic economy, more gender equality in the market (facilitated by reducing the 
economy-wide gender–wage gap for example) generates efficiency gains that are not 
reaped in a selfish economy. The more gender egalitarian the care relations, the larger 
these efficiency gains. These efficiency gains partly run through an efficiency wage type 
of effect in the paid care sector, leading to higher labor productivity as well as higher 
quality of caring services. Stronger work motivation underlying efficiency wages directly 
contributes to the quality of care through a crowding-in effect of altruistic motivations. 
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For example, with higher quality healthcare there are fewer days lost and less loss in 
productivity by sick workers in the labor market. 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Modeling exercises such as this one are admittedly rife with sometimes troubling 
oversimplifications and abstraction. Even though incorporating care and the notion of 
labor as a produced input is an instructive effort to widen standard economic discourse, 
we are still limited by structures that value care according to its role in market production 
rather than, for instance, its being essential for well-being or an ethical society[OK?]. 
One practical consequence is that our notion of human capacities represents only the 
reproduction of current market workers and the production of future ones, and it does not 
incorporate the care that goes into supporting the elderly or the permanently disabled. We 
do not see the latter as out of reach of our current modeling framework, however, which 
could incorporate the dynamics of externalities, insurance, and risk into investment and 
care decisions in ways that reflect differing types of dependencies, or switch around the 
output and human capacities variables, making the latter a central shift variable. 
 The point of modeling is just as much to uncover what we do not understand as it 
is to discover what we do. Part of the feminist project is to shift economic discourse, and 
that the discipline is so driven by modeling requires that feminists develop alternatives to 
standard techniques. Ultimately, then, the model’s most important contribution lies in 
underscoring the complexity and insight afforded by embedding unpaid work and care in 
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macroeconomic modeling, as a proposition as seemingly as obvious as suggesting that 
human capacities are produced introduces a whole new aspect to standard 
macroeconomic approaches to understanding the dynamics of output and investment. It 
thereby contributes to new understandings of macroeconomics, which increasingly 
recognizes the endogeneity of technology and human capital. Understanding the 
endogeneity of paid and unpaid labor and their feedback effects on the economy as a 
whole cannot remain outside of these developments. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 The term “care economy” was coined by Elson (1995). 
2
 Akram-Lodhi and Hanmer (2008) present a completely theoretical model with no 
geographic orientation, while Fontana (2002) uses Bangladesh and Zambia as case 
studies. 
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3
 The assumption of sticky wages ensures that the AS curve is upward sloping in the short 
run, and therefore is responsible for much of the predictions of the AD-AS model 
regarding demand and supply shocks. On the other hand, the policy prescriptions of a 
structuralist model will not depend on short-run frictions in the labor market, but on the 
extent to which the social structure of production assigns low or high bargaining power to 
paid workers in the economy. 
4
 Keynes used the term “animal spirits” to describe investors’ behavior as depending not 
on interest rates and market values of assets, which argued were not an adequate 
reflection of financial value. Instead, he recognized that investors act on the basis of a 
taste for risk as well as optimism that they will be able to beat the market. Hence, 
investors’ motivations are largely intuitive and influenced by what others do and by rules 
of thumb rather than by narrow rationality as a cost–benefit analysis. 
5
 We abstract from interest rates in this model because we are not concerned, at least at 
this point, with how the cost of capital (both human and physical) affects investment 
demand. Besides, it is likely that interest rates are of minimal importance in determining 
how nonmarket work and care play out macroeconomically. 
6
 The additional question of how caring spirits are endogenous, and how processes such 
as industrialization, growth, or economic decline affect caring spirits is an interesting 
one, and it is perhaps one we can get a firmer handle on with more systematic cross-
cultural and time series analyses of time-use studies. 
7
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
8
 Completely segregating the market work of women versus men in this way is a stylized 
reflection of the fact that occupational segregation by sex is extensive in a variety of 
 44 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries, and that women tend to cluster in human services such as teaching, medicine 
and nursing, personal services (such as hairdressing or housekeeping), and clerical 
assistance (Anker 1998). Even among low- and middle-income countries where formal 
human service delivery is not well developed, paid care is often provided informally via 
the employment of domestic workers (Shahra Razavi 2007). 
9
 As one anonymous reviewer points out, since the labor coefficient a in equation (16) is 
not constant in the model, an increase in the rate of capacity utilization will not 
automatically tighten the labor market and produce an increase in wages. In particular, 
equation (16) shows that an increase in z actually lowers the labor coefficient a. To 
maintain the conflicting features of distribution in response to capacity increases, that is 
to ensure that labor’s bargaining power rises with capacity, we assume that the response 
of a to z is less than proportional.  
10
 There is no capital in the price equations as it needlessly raises the complication level 
of the system. Alternatively, one could substantiate this assumption based on the labor 
theory of value, and that capital depreciation costs are already embedded in wage costs. 
11
 In Kaleckian-type macro models, the markup is typically linked with the degee of 
monopoly power or industrial concentration. There are others, however, that take a 
different approach. Amitav Krishna Dutt (1987) posits fixed prices and a markup that 
varies with corporate power vis-à-vis trade unions. Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) use a 
flexible markup that rises along with capacity utilization. And Samuel Bowles and Robert 
Boyer (1990) propose a flexible markup that reflects efficiency wage dynamics (as 
unemployment declines and the cost of job loss goes down, capitalists are compelled to 
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raise wages to maintain labor discipline). Our specification also reflects the power of 
female sector capitalists.  
12
 This is not to say that there are not single mothers in the other regimes, only that 
women get little care support from the state or absentee fathers. 
13
 To formally conduct the comparative statics on the IS/PE system, we actually have to 
use the implicit function theorem and Cramer’s Rule, which we have done but have not 
included here. 
